SELF-SELECTION UNDER NON-ORDERED VALUATIONS: TYPE-SPLITTING, ENVY-CYCLES, RATIONING AND EFFICIENCY by Babu Nahata et al.
SELF-SELECTION UNDER NON-ORDERED
VALUATIONS: TYPE-SPLITTING,
ENVY-CYCLES, RATIONING AND EFFICIENCY
By Babu Nahata,
Department of Economics, University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky 40292, USA. nahata@louisville.edu,
Serguei Kokovin and Evgeny Zhelobodko
Department of Economics, Novosibirsk State University
Novosibirsk 630090, Russia. kokovin@math.nsc.ru, ezhel@ieie.nsc.ru
Abstract
We analyze self-selection problem when valuations are non-ordered. The corre-
sponding package-pricing solution has speciﬁc graph structure. It is helpful in deriv-
ing weak suﬃcient conditions for both partial eﬃciency and Pareto-eﬃciency. Un-
like the ordered valuations case, Pareto eﬃciency is shown to be a non-pathological
case. Pareto eﬃciency and positive consumer surplus are mutually exclusive. Under
costs separability optimal package-pricing scheme is shown implementable by small
rewards. Counter-examples show that our assumptions are essential. In certain
non-ordered situations, package-optimization setting with rations is more appropri-
ate than the standard setting.
Key Words: Principal-agent, self-selection, nonlinear pricing, package pricing,
Pareto eﬃciency, implementation, graph structure, envy cycles
JEL Codes: D42, L11
0SELF-SELECTION UNDER NON-ORDERED
VALUATIONS: TYPE-SPLITTING,
ENVY-CYCLES, RATIONING AND EFFICIENCY ¤
By Babu Nahata, Serguei Kokovin and Evgeny Zhelobodko y
Abstract
We analyze self-selection problem when valuations are non-ordered. The corre-
sponding package-pricing solution has speciﬁc graph structure. It is helpful in deriv-
ing weak suﬃcient conditions for both partial eﬃciency and Pareto-eﬃciency. Un-
like the ordered valuations case, Pareto eﬃciency is shown to be a non-pathological
case. Pareto eﬃciency and positive consumer surplus are mutually exclusive. Under
costs separability optimal package-pricing scheme is shown implementable by small
rewards. Counter-examples show that our assumptions are essential. In certain
non-ordered situations, package-optimization setting with rations is more appropri-
ate than the standard setting.
Key Words: Principal-agent, self-selection, nonlinear pricing, package pricing,
Pareto eﬃciency, implementation, graph structure, envy cycles
JEL Codes: D42, L11
1 introduction
Consider a general principal-agent problem with several hidden types of agents,
also known as ‘self-selection problem.’ This problem arises in designing Pareto-optimum
taxation schemes, in optimal compensation decisions, and in many optimal contracts
design. For the sake of simplicity, we formulate and analyze this general problem in a
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1speciﬁc setting but perhaps in its most common application, namely in the context of a
nonlinear pricing problem or the so called second-degree price discrimination.
We analyze the case when a monopolistic seller (a principal) of a single good uses a
set of several packages as the self-selection devices to handle ﬁnitely-many hidden types
of consumers (agents). A package is a quantity-outlay couple and package-plan is a menu
of several packages, suggested to consumers. Although a consumer can select any package
of her choice, she can take only one and cannot negotiate (‘take-it-or-leave-it’). Given
the probabilities or quantities of all consumer types, the optimal package-plan is one that
maximizes total proﬁt.1
Most known results related to this standard packages problem are derived assuming
ordered valuations of agents (valuation function, or ‘valuation’ is the integral of inverse-
demand function) implying that the demand functions do not cross (‘no-crossing condi-
tion’, or Spence-Mirrlees condition). Under this assumption, together with concavity and
diﬀerentiability of valuation functions, well-known theorem establishes a ‘chain-rule’ solu-
tion structure, enabling a simple solution and derivation of its properties (see Katz, 1983,
Salanie, 1997). Chain-rule means that at the optimal solution each consumer ‘almost-
envies’ only her closest lower-demand neighbor and no one else, i.e., among the incentive-
compatibility constraints, the only one related to her lower-demand-neighbor’s package
are active and binding. The standard result is that the lowest-demand agent has zero
consumer surplus, while other agents have some positive surplus which is informational
rent. Only the highest-demand consumer’s package is partially-eﬃcient (i.e., sum of this
agent’s and principal’s objective functions cannot be increased by modifying this package,
ceteris paribus). Similar results have been obtained by Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984) when
the distribution of consumer types is continuous (see also Varian (1989), Salanie (1997)).
1Essentially, package pricing is just a non-linear outlay function which can either be step-wise or
continuous. Our interest in package pricing is because use of packages is quite prevalent for numerous
types of goods. From a theoretical standpoint, under usual assumptions, including no arbitrage, package
pricing is the best non-linear pricing scheme in the sense that it is at least as proﬁtable as any other
outlay function (see Katz, 1984). For many real life examples and treatment of more general nonlinear
pricing, see Wilson (1993).
2In contrast, the problem of non-ordered valuations has drawn much less attention be-
cause the analytic framework is more complex and tedious, even though it is as much
realistic as the ordered ones.2 The only paper familiar to us that does not require valua-
tions to be ordered is by Guesnerie and Seade (1982). The paper considers the standard
ﬁnite-packages problem using general, non-quasi linear, strictly concave, diﬀerentiable
utility functions, having ‘locally diﬀerent’ derivatives. Costs are linear. Without order-
ing, the solution structure becomes rather complex because the chain-rule is no more
applicable. Nonetheless, it was found that the graph of active constraints must have
at least one envy-free node, i.e., this package chosen by some consumers is strictly not
preferred by others. Consequently, this agent’s consumption is partially-eﬃcient.
Under similar framework, we assume quasi-linear utility functions, but impose no other
restrictions on preferences or costs, at least for the structure of solutions. Valuation func-
tions may be non-ordered, non-increasing (satiable), non-continuous, and non-concave,
thus encompassing the case when quantities are discrete (e.g., cars, houses etc.). The
solution is shown to have at least a speciﬁc tree-structure. In a special case of ordered
valuations it has the usual chain-structure. Thus the solution structure is shown not to
depend upon concavity or continuity (our advanced chain-rule claim generalizes the usual
claims). Tree-structure enables us to derive some solution properties. Under additional
assumptions like cost separability (e.g., linearity) or valuation concavity, partially-eﬃcient
package exists. Counter-examples show that these assumptions are essential. Thus we
show that partial eﬃciency is dependent upon concavity/separability, but not on ‘local
diﬀerences’ among consumers. Generally, in ordered case there is consumer surplus and
there is no Pareto-eﬃciency, with unnatural exceptions. In contrast, Pareto-eﬃciency
of solutions is shown to be rather normal (non-degenerate) outcome under non-ordered
2As a practical situation, suppose consumer A being very thirsty is willing to pay $1 for the ﬁrst half-
glass of soft drink, but feels satiated with only 0.5 liter, while another consumer B would pay only $0.5
for the ﬁrst half-glass of soft drink but is willing to buy a liter. This example shows non-orderedness of
demands (valuations). Many pricing practices used to sell soft drinks through packages can be explained
only with non-ordered valuations. Although it may appear irrational, but 0.5l and 1.0l bottles sometimes
are sold for the same price! Such practice not only can be a seller’s optimal strategy, but all such outcomes
are Pareto-eﬃcient (see Nahata, Kokovin, Zhelobodko, 2002).
3valuations. It typically occurs when solution’s graph is star-like (though there are counter-
examples), that excludes consumer surplus. In this case interests of consumers conﬂict
with social eﬃciency.
It is worth mentioning that for all propositions we seek suﬃcient conditions which are
close to necessary ones. Further, our results are general enough to be applicable to all
situations of self-selection, including both deterministic and probabilistic settings.
The usually employed standard analysis in ﬁnding optimal solutions for ordered case
faces conceptual challenges under non-ordered valuations because of type-splitting and
envy-cycles creating an implementation puzzle (which so far remains unexplored).3 A
package-plan is called non-implementable in some self-selection game, when the principal
cannot enforce the game plan to earn the planned proﬁt. In essence, the ‘implementation
puzzle’ questions the conventional assumption of a ‘friendly consumer,’ who among her
most-preferred packages chooses the package most proﬁtable for the seller. In the ordered
case this assumption can be supported by the idea that small rewards can be given to
consumers for such a behavior. But the rewards do not help in some non-ordered situations
because ‘cycles of envy’ can occur. Besides, the standard optimization assumes designing
as many packages or less as the number of consumer types. As our examples show, this
can result in non-optimal solution in non-ordered case where type-splitting occurs. As a
result, the standard package-optimization setting can become inadequate in handling the
game in question, either because of non-implementability reason or due to type-splitting.
What is then the appropriate setting? How should a principal design a package
scheme? In Section 2, we propose ‘allocated-packages’ setting to handle type-splitting. It
implies ‘rationing.’ It means that the seller limits the supply of certain packages. Such
practice is frequently observed in real life and our arguments justify its use. Rationing
also helps in implementing standard package-plans, at least in regular situations. But, in
some degenerate cases even rationing also fails (Example 1). We suggest a speciﬁc cure, a
‘preference- revealing menu’ for such cases. Interestingly these non-standard tools (rations
and menu) not only can be used to implement standard package-plan, but they may also
3Explanation of these terms and problems are given in Section 2, after formal setting.
4bring higher proﬁt (especially when combined with allocations) because rationing may
replace some incentive-compatibility constraints in the optimization problem. In general,
however the answer to the question of most appropriate setting remains unclear.
For markets where rations cannot be used, we identify conditions for implementation of
standard package-plan through rewards. In particular, ‘essential’ envy-cycles, ‘essential’
splitting and non-implementability are excluded when costs are separable (e.g., linear), or
under ‘strict gross convexity’ of optimization problem. Therefore, the standard package
solution is implementable for rather broad class of situations, though exceptions are non-
degenerate (see Example 5).
Section 2 contains formulation of the problem and a brief discussion of non-implemen-
tability. Section 3 states conditions for implementability. Section 4 deals with eﬃciency.
Appendix contains most proofs, some examples and ﬁgures.
2 self-selection model and implementation
problem
Consider the standard setting. A monopolist (principal) producing a homogeneous
good oﬀers several packages (quantity-outlay bundles (x1;t1);::::;(xn;tn) 2 R2) to n types
of consumers (agents), who are indexed as i 2 I := f1;:::;ng, and mi > 0 denotes
population of each type. The valuations of possible types are known to the seller, but
‘who is who’ is hidden, or personal discrimination is impossible. Each agent selects a
single package, and both multiple purchases and arbitrage are prevented. To simplify the
analysis, all consumers of a given type choose the same package (‘no splitting-of-types
is allowed). In certain circumstances this assumption may appear non-restrictive, since
several similar consumers may be treated as diﬀerent types. In some other situations, we
shall show, it is restrictive. As broadly recognized, under no-splitting, it is suﬃcient for
the monopolist to design exactly n packages for n consumer types, although some packages
may be identical in size or contain quantity equal to zero. Thus the actual number of
packages may be fewer than n. Following another common convention, we suppose that
5among all equivalent options an agent chooses the package preferred by the principal (a
‘friendly agent’). As shown later both these assumptions become questionable under
non-ordered valuations.
The number mi > 0 of consumers of type i; can either be an integer or a fraction
of population. In a probabilistic interpretation of the model, each mi can be treated
as probability of type i so that Σimi = 1. Utility functions are assumed to be quasi-
linear and depend on quantity and tariﬀ (outlay): ui(xi;ti) = Vi(xi) ¡ ti, so income
eﬀects are ruled out. Each valuation function Vi(:) is normalized as Vi(0) = 08i. In the
deterministic setting cost function C : R2n¡ > R may depend upon the total output in
the form C(m;x) = c(
P
i mixi), (where c : R2n¡ > R). Alternatively, it may take the
form C(m;x) =
P
i mic(xi) in probabilistic case, denoting expected production cost (thus
appearing separable).4 Under the above assumptions, our two-stage leader-follower game







Vi(xi) ¡ ti ¸ Vi(xk) ¡ tk 8i 2 I;8k 2 I [ f0g n fig; (2)
(x0;t0) := (0;0):
Here Xn := X £:::::£X ½ Rn is an admissible consumption set, consisting of several
sets X ½ R assumed to be similar for all agents, for simplicity. The novelty in our
formulation is that consumption set X may either be convex or non-convex, continuous
or discrete, the only restriction is the normalization assumption 0 2 X: For notational
convenience, we have introduced a dummy agent #0 whose package by deﬁnition is (0;0).
With dummy agent the ‘participation constraints’ Vi(xi) ¡ ti ¸ Vi(0) ¡ 0 = 0 can be
treated as special cases of incentive-compatibility or ‘self-selection’ constraints Vi(xi)¡ti ¸
Vk(xk)¡tk: All such constraints imply that no consumer wishes to switch to anyone else’s
package, including the package #0, i.e., no i ‘strictly envies’ anyone. The situation when
a constraint (i;k) is active (i.e., being equality) can be interpreted, following Wilson
(1993), as consumer i ‘almost-envying’ consumer k’s package. Note, that no positivity
4Here, in each period the seller expects one client of type i with probability mi. The cost functions
are more complex for situations when several customers can be served in a period.
6or increasing-functions assumptions are made, so the model can be directly applied to a
principal having a revenue function (¡C(m;x1;:::;xn)) ¸ 0 and paying rewards (¡ti) ¸ 0
to hired agents, whose utility from working xi hours is Vi(xi); it may decrease and become
negative. Besides, decreasing valuations may express demand satiability.
The existence of solutions is a standard result in the literature and therefore we do
not discuss it here.
What merits some discussion is the standard assumption (in essence incorporated right
into formulation of the optimization problem 1) about agents being ‘friendly’ to the seller.
In the traditional ordered-valuation situation this assumption is justiﬁable, because of the
chain-structure of solutions. More generally, when a solution structure is transitive, i.e.,
when it lacks ‘envy-cycles’, then the seller can (almost-) implement (see "-implementability
deﬁnition below) optimal package scheme (¯ x;¯ t) by oﬀering arbitrarily small reward (i.e.,
reduction in tariﬀ "i) to each consumer i for choosing exactly the seller-preferred package
(¯ xi;¯ ti¡"i) out of her set of most-preferred packages. The rewards thus break all envy-links
(i.e., constraints-equalities) converting them into strict inequalities and enforcing ‘friendly
behavior’.
However, under non-ordered valuations this tool may appear insuﬃcient and the stan-
dard optimization setting (1) may become inadequate to the game of selling. To grasp
this problem, the essence of non-ordered valuations and envy-cycles, consider the example
below.
[FIGURE 1]
Example 1: ( package scheme non-implementable by rations/rewards).
Suppose that three two-humped camels (Bactrians are good examples, see Figure 1)
are willing to buy up to 6 apples from a monkey. Suppose the ﬁrst consumer’s valuations
are: V1(1) = $2 for 1 apple, V1(2) = $3:1 for 2 apples, while greater quantities do
not increase satisfaction: V1(x) = $3:1 for x ¸ 2. The second consumer’s valuations
are: V2(1) = $2 for 1 apple, V2(2) = $2:5 for 2, and V2(x) = $4:2 for x ¸ 3. The
third consumer’s valuations are: V3(1) = $1:5 for 1 apple, V3(2) = $3:1 for 2 apples,
and V3(x) = $4:2 for x ¸ 3. For all three Vi(0) = 0. Thus the three consumers has
7satiable demands, pair-wise coinciding at certain points. Cost function is C(x1;x2;x3) =
c(x1 + x2 + x3) = (x1 + x2 + x3) + 100(x1 + x2 + x3 ¡ 6 + jx1 + x2 + x3 ¡ 6j). It shows
that costs are linear (with factor 1) for less than 6 apples, but drastically increase when
quantities are higher than 6. Subtracting the ﬂat linear component 1x from the cost
function (˜ c(x) := c(x)¡x) and from the valuation functions, we can express the problem
in terms of reduced valuations, deﬁned as vi(x) := Vi(x) ¡ x, see Figure 1 (it is similar
to net valuations, deﬁned as vi(x) := Vi(x) ¡ c(x)).5 The ordinate in Figure 1 is the
reduced valuation or net-tariﬀ (net of cost). It shows proﬁt and/or consumer surplus
that can be obtained from any package. The three net-utility indiﬀerence curves namely
v1(x) ¡ t (dotted), v2(x) ¡ t (dashed), and v3(x) ¡ t (solid) starting from the origin show
active participation constraints, arrows showing directions of increase (gradients). We use
here some continuous curves interpolating points 1, 2 and 3, assuming that fractions of an
apple are available. It is more expressive, while logic of example is the same as for discrete
consumer set X = Z+. What matters, is that each indiﬀerence curve has 2 humps and
both local maxima can become optimal packages.
In order to ﬁnd here an optimal package scheme, suppose (unreasonably) that the mon-
key has full information about each camel’s willingness-to-pay, and the seller can prevent
each consumer from taking a package designed for someone else. Then, obviously, optimal
packages are ¯ x1 = 1, ¯ x2 = 2, ¯ x3 = 3, the related net tariﬀs (proﬁts) being t1 = 1 , t2 = 1:1,
t3 = 1:2, and gross tariﬀs are T1 = 2, T2 = 3:1, T3 = 4:2: Note that it is the unique optimal
solution, because increasing any of the packages ¯ xi would result in great additional cost,
while decreasing would reduce proﬁt. This scheme (¯ x;t) is incentive compatible giving a
ﬁrst-best and Pareto-eﬃcient solution to the standard package-optimization problem (1).
5Another (simpler) way to introduce this example is to assume just zero costs c(x) = 0 for the available
6 apples (the monkey already has them and no more), and assume initial valuations like V1(1) = $2 =
V2(1); V1(2) = $3:1 = V3(2); V2(3) = $4:2 = V3(3), equal to our ‘reduced’ valuations vi(x) obtained
by cost subtraction. The point of starting with positive costs was to explain net valuations/tariﬀs used
in all examples, and to show that this and of all other examples are not due to zero-cost or satiable-
demand assumptions. Operating in backward direction, i.e., adding a suﬃciently steep linear function to
all valuations and costs, one can transform any of our examples into non-satiable-demand positive-cost
examples, keeping all eﬀects in place!
8However, one can check that there is no way to implement (or "-implement) it, either
through small rewards or by simple rationing!
Simple rationing means that the monkey suggests a menu of three packages: 1 apple
for $2, or 2 apples for $3:1, or 3 apples for $4:2. It is made known that when someone
takes any one of the three packages then that package is gone, so the next selection must
be made from the remaining two packages. This strategy is observed in practice, for
example, when a waiter in a restaurant tells the guest that a particular item from the
menu is already sold out and therefore not available.
Possibility of such rationing can be formally incorporated into some non-standard
package-optimization problem. It can also help in implementing standard solutions in
some situations, but not in this case. Indeed, the monkey can obtain the desired ﬁrst-best
proﬁt of $3:3 when the ﬁrst camel takes x1 = 1, second takes x2 = 2, and the third takes
what remains. Or when the ﬁrst camel takes x1 = 2, the second takes x2 = 3 , and the
third what remains. But when the ﬁrst camel takes x1 = 1, and the second takes x2 = 3,
then the third takes x3 = 0, in other words, just goes away, leaving the monkey with a
proﬁt of only $2 instead of $3.6 Small rewards also cannot help, since the three packages
are linked together in a cycle of almost-envy. If everybody behaves ‘right,’ each camel
still ‘almost-envies’ the other one in a circle #1 ! #2 ! #3 ! #1, and everybody
‘almost-envies’ to zero: #1 ! 0;#2 ! 0;#3 ! 0: If all are behaving wrong from seller’s
perspective (another proﬁtable situation), the cycle is backward #3 ! #2 ! #1 ! #3:
In both situations it is evident that nothing can break the cycle and a considerable (about
$0:5 on average) loss of expected proﬁt is inevitable in implementing a solution to the
standard optimal package!
However, non-standard proﬁtable alternative is not to oﬀer the second package at all,
thus loosing $0:1 for sure (instead of loosing $1 with probability 0:5) but breaking the
cycle: ˜ x = (1, 1, 3), ˜ T = (2, 2, 4:2). One apple remains unsold (recall, purchasing
6The probability of such ‘bad’ outcome for the monkey is 1=2, because after somebody takes any
‘right,’ or ‘wrong’ package, the next selection would also be either ‘right,’ or ‘wrong’ one. Since for the
seller the most desired sequence is (‘right’, ‘right’) or (‘wrong’, ‘wrong’), average expected loss is not less
than 1=6 of proﬁt or about $1/2.
9twice is forbidden, for alternative assumption see Katz, 1984). In this package scheme
consumers #1; and #2 are ‘bunched together’ for one package and the scheme becomes
implementable.jj
Can valuations concavity guard against non-implementable cycles? If it is not com-
bined with cost convexity and some additional restrictions, the answer is ‘no’, see Exam-
ple 2 below.
In essence, Examples 1and 2 show that non-orderedness of valuations and ‘essential’
cycle of envy can make the standard optimization setting and the resulting solution unrea-
sonable (irrelevant to reality). ‘Essential’ cycle (deﬁned below as ‘non-reducible’) means
that there is no way to restructure the designed package scheme keeping the same proﬁt.
In contrast, the ‘3-camels’ example modiﬁed by rounding numbers 3:1 ! 3, 4:2 ! 4
would have ‘nonessential’ cycle, reducible to implementable package scheme ˜ x = (1;1;3)
without sacriﬁcing $0:1 of proﬁt.
We can compare the ‘implementation problem’ described here with similar problems
in ideal price discrimination, in two-part tariﬀ and in other situations, where monopolist
takes all consumer surplus by relying upon the ‘friendly’ behavior of the consumer, i.e.,
in her staying in the market. In most such situations this problem is solved trivially by
small rewards and escaped much attention. But it is serious here.
Now consider ‘splitting’. What if 10 camels of each type came to this monkey seller
having 6 apples and no more? Again this monkey monopolist can get his proﬁt ¼ $3,
but now the assumption of no-splitting becomes invalid. Since rationing must occur, its
possibility should be included into the optimization problem. Example 5 in the Appendix
(see Figure 5 also) shows that optimal splitting of essentially-similar consumer types be-
tween diﬀerent packages (and the resulting cycle of envy) can happen even when costs
are convex and valuations are concave (but non-ordered).
Since these examples show splitting becoming optimal, the question arises: how many
packages are necessary? In continuous-type settings the usual answer is to design a
continuous curve of contracts, but sometimes it does not result in one-to-one mapping of
agents’ types, so the essence of the question remains. In our ﬁnite-type setting one solution
10is to handle each consumer as a separate type (formally), then no more than º :=
Pn
i=1 mi
packages are needed. However, this formalization is inconvenient for discussing optimal
splitting (information on agents’ similarity disappears). Besides, in stochastic setting we
have mi :
Pn
i=1 mi := 1, so this trick with predetermined maximum º is unavailable.
Instead, to ﬁnd º and optimal splitting we can formulate the following ‘allocated-
packages’ optimization problem, implying, in essence, some kind of rationing.7
‘Allocated-packages’ setting (compare with Katz, 1984). The principal chooses a
number of packages º 2 Z+ and some n £ º ‘allocation matrix’ A = (a11;:::;a1º;:::;an1;
:::;anº): In a deterministic setting each aik 2 Z+ shows how many consumers of type i
buy the package-type k: In stochastic setting aik 2 [0;1] means the probability of how
often such consumer buys such a package. The one-man-one-package assumption is ex-
pressed as
P





1nAx. Incentive-compatibility constraints become more numerous: vi(xk)¡tk ¸ vi(xj)¡
tj 8j 8(i;k) : aik > 0. Everything else remains the same as in the standard setting.
Note, that standard setting is similar to this new one, except for two additional con-
straints: 1) standard º := n, and 2) standard allocation matrix should be a diagonal n£n
matrix with mi on the diagonal. So, the ‘allocated packages’ optimization problem has
fewer constraints than the standard problem. Therefore, it must bring the same or more
proﬁt, than the standard one. Speciﬁcally, proﬁt can be shown to be exactly the same
for ordered valuations, there is no need for splitting. But for non-ordered case our exam-
ples show the allocated setting being better (more proﬁtable). Hence ‘allocated packages’
are conceptually more adequate when they are implementable. However, two conceptual
hardships remain.
First, it is easy to see that implementation of solution still remains puzzling under
‘allocated’ optimization. It may even seem becoming worse. How can the seller enforce a
‘friendly behavior’ from the splitted consumer types? But actually it is not worse, indeed
it is the same. After an allocated solution is found, it can be rearranged as the standard
7By the way, in the case of optimal splitting we necessarily see cycles of envy among formally-diﬀerent,
but really-similar consumers. Thus, implementability by rewards always becomes questionable under
optimal splitting and hence there is need for rations.
11one. Just treat allocated consumers as n£º formally-diﬀerent types of consumers indexed
by (i;k), each with quantities ˜ m(i;k) = aik . Therefore, all the properties of solutions of the
standard optimization setting also apply to the solutions with allocated packages. This
to some extent supports the conceptual framework in our analysis of standard solutions
below. Still, it is applicable only to the situations where cycles are absent or reducible,
or rationing can be practiced and allocations are implementable as in Example 5. We
have no idea about the optimization setting that would, generally, be reasonable when
rationing cannot be used (what are the examples of such industries?), or what should
the principal do normally in cases such as Example 1 (‘3-camels’) to maximize expected
proﬁt.
Second, in situations where rationing can be practiced, it raises an additional question.
In some variations of the game, as can be seen in Examples 4 and 6 (see Figures 4,
6 and Appendix), rationing can replace some incentive-compatibility constraints from
the allocated-packages optimization setting! It can further increase proﬁt, in essence by
discouraging an agent not to switch to an unproﬁtable package. So far we have not found
the general formulation and solution to this puzzle.
However, when rationing devices can be used, some other approach, a ‘preference
revealing menu,’ can be suggested to increase proﬁt further. The idea is simple with
practical implications. The principal suggests a menu of packages and asks each agent to
identify her all most preferred packages. The principal then oﬀers her one out of these
packages of his choice. Agents should not have any incentive to lie, and the principal now
has a new tool revealing consumer types and implementing best solutions. This is not
just a mechanism to implement the standard package scheme, it may also bring higher
proﬁt, since generally some incentive constraints may be violated under rations. For some
situations this approach could be more appropriate than the standard one.
In the next section we study implementation only by rewards for situations when
rations are unnecessary or unavailable. We just identify diﬀerent envy-cycles and cases
when rewards are suﬃcient for implementing standard solutions, which is also the same
for implementing allocated packages.
123 solution structure and implementation
We ﬁrst introduce some common graph notions, and some speciﬁc terms for describing
active constraints structures and partial order in the “envy-space.”
Commonly, a directed graph, or “digraph” G =< N;E > is a collection of nodes
(vertices) N(G) and collections of arcs (oriented edges) E(G). Somewhat loosely we use
notations i 2 G , i 2 N(G); and (i ! j) 2 G , (i ! j) 2 E(G). Pairs like (i ! j) or
(i;j) denote an arc from node i (arc’s tail, or adjacent predecessor of j) to node j (arc’s
head, or adjacent successor of i). A node without predecessors is a source, while a node
without successors is a sink. (Di-)chain is a sequence of edges with distinct edges, it is a
(di-)path when vertices are distinct also. Dicircuit or (di-)cycle is a closed path, i.e., one
starting and ending with the same node. Acyclic (lacking di-cycles) digraph is an in-tree,
if it has a “root” node, such that every other node is connected to it by a unique dipath
(i.e., “root” is reachable from every node). More generally, digraph having a single sink
(“root”) will be called here an in-rooted (or single-sink) digraph if the root is reachable
from any other node. Obviously, in-tree is in-rooted and any in-rooted digraph contains
a spanning in-tree, i.e., such in-tree that contains all digraph’s nodes. A source of an
in-rooted graph is a leaf. Digraph is strongly connected when all its vertices are reachable
from each other.
We express partial order within digraphs in terms of nodes “height” relative to each
other. Predecessors are considered to be not lower than successors. A node i is strictly
higher than its successor j when i is not a successor of j. In cycles or other strongly
connected subgraphs all nodes are supposed equally high. A sink is the lowest node in the
in-rooted graph.
Our problem (1)–(2) generates diﬀerent digraph structures (see Figures). “All-arcs”
digraph Gall contains all n£n incentive-compatibility constraints (2) treated as oriented
arcs, and all n+1 agents’ numbers (names) treated as nodes. An arc (i ! j) denoting the
constraint Vi(xi) ¡ ti ¸ Vi(xj) ¡ tj, implies that agent i does not envy agent j’s package.
Node #0 is the “root” or the “sink” and is also the “lowest” node, while Gall n f#0g is
strongly connected.
13Further, any package plan (x;t) admissible in our problem (1)–( 2) generates two
interrelated subgraphs of Gall: active agent-graph and active package-graph. Functions Vi
being ﬁxed, for a given (x;t), its “envy-graph” or active agent-graph ¯ ¯ G(x;t) = ¯ ¯ GV(x;t) ½
Gall is deﬁned as the collection of all nodes f0;1;2;:::;ng and of all active constraints,
i.e., those becoming equality at point (x;t) 2 R2n. Thus an arc (i ! j) , Vi(xi) ¡
ti = Vi(xj) ¡ tj is interpreted as ‘consumer i almost-envying consumer j ’s choice,’ and
¯ ¯ G : R2n 7! Gall is a well-deﬁned function, relating any package-plan (x;t) to its active
agent-graph ¯ ¯ G(x;t). Orientation of any arc (i ! j) is downwards in the “envy-space”.
This convention becomes convenient in comparing the envy-space (graph order) and the
‘proﬁt-space,’ often keeping the same direction (see our examples and ﬁgures).
Active package-graph ¯ ¯ GP(x;t) is the “bunching” of the agent-graph ¯ ¯ G(x;t). Bunching
means modifying graph such that any couple of agent-nodes i;j having the same package
(in the sense (xi;ti) = (xj;tj)) becomes a single package-node with name (ij), while arcs
(i ! j) and (j ! i) are eliminated. Similarly several agents “bunched” together become
one package-node.
We are ready to state our main results. ‘Tree-rule’ Theorem 1 determines the solution
structure for both ordered and non-ordered valuations, and is used in proving Theorem 2
and Propositions.
In the statement of the theorem, we denote the adjacent successor of the node i in the
in-tree G by b(i;G), and the set of all successors of i, up to the root (all nodes “below”
i) by B(i;G). So B(:) is a mapping, while b(:) 2 B(:) is a function.
Theorem 1 (“Tree-rule”): Let bundle (¯ x;¯ t) 2 R2n be a solution to the optimization
problem given by (1 )-(2). Then (A): All active constraints at (¯ x;¯ t) represent an in-
rooted (single-sink) digraph ¯ ¯ G = ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) with root #0. (B): There exists a spanning
in-tree GT µ ¯ ¯ G of digraph ¯ ¯ G, describing a subset of active incentive constraints, such that
(¯ x;¯ t) is also a solution to the reduced optimization problem (3)-(4), and all solutions to
the reduced problem (3)-(4) are also the solutions to initial problem (1)-(2). Any spanning




mi Ti(x;GT) ¡ C(m;x) ! max
x2Xn s.t. (3)





[Vi(xi) ¡ Vi(xb(i;GT))] (8k 2 I); T0(:) ´ 0 :
A particular case of ‘tree-rule’ is stated below.
Proposition 1 (“Chain-rule”): Assume valuations obeying the Spence-Mirrlees or-
dering condition: [x;z 2 X; x > z ) Vi(x) ¡ Vi(z) > Vi¡1(x) ¡ Vi¡1(z) 8i = 2;:::;n].
Then the active graph (guaranteed by Theorem 1) of a solution (¯ x;¯ t) amounts to the chain
GT = GC := ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) = (n ! n ¡ 1 ! n ¡ 2::: ! 0); and all not-in-chain incentive con-
straints (4) can be replaced by constraints xi¡1 · xi (8i 2 I); x0 = 0 in the optimization
problem (3)-(4).9
Proof: see the Appendix.
To appreciate the usefulness of these results, note that Theorem 1 reduces the number
of optimization variables by half and provides a clear algorithm for optimization. It is
suﬃcient to try all trees, then compare the resulting tree-speciﬁc solutions. For each
tree one can optimize as follows. First ﬁnd an unconstrained optimum of the tree-speciﬁc
objective function (3), then add the violated constraints (if any) and solve again, and
8Caution: diﬀerent solutions to initial problem may result from diﬀerent tree-structures, so only full
collection of tree-speciﬁc problems can be called “equivalent” to the initial problem.
9Proposition 1 is essentially the ‘chain-rule theorem’, generalizing similar claims (Katz, 1973) in some
respects. Cost function may have both probabilistic and deterministic interpretations, we neither require
continuity nor convexity (or concavity). Besides, increasing condition [ x ¸ z ) V1(x)¡V1(z) ¸ 0] turns
out to be unnecessary. In contrast, it is easy to prove that some valuations ordering is essential for chain-
rule: when any incentive-compatible package plan obeys chained order of quantities [ ¯ xi¡1 · ¯ xi (i 2 I)],
then valuations satisfy weak Spence-Mirrlees ordering condition on these quantity couples: [ i > k )
Vi(¯ xi)¡Vi(¯ xk) ¸ Vk(¯ xi)¡Vk(¯ xk) 8i;k 2 I]. Instead of direct proof, our generalized chain-rule can also
be obtained from Milgrom and Shannon’s (1993) theorems on Spence-Mirrlees condition and comparative
statics, by interpreting package size and tree-position as monotone functions of agent’s number.
15so on. Our experience shows that this optimization sequence algorithmically is the most
eﬃcient. For optimization, as well as for deriving properties of solutions in Proposition
2, the following reformulation of objective function is helpful.
¼(x;GT) : = [
n X
i=1
Qi(xi;GT)] ¡ C(m;x) where (5)







mj (8i 2 I);
where A(i;G) denotes the set of all nodes lying above the node i (predecessors), while
A1(i;G) µ A(i;G) denotes the set of only adjacent predecessors of the node i (derivation
of Qi can be checked directly using recursion).
This formulation of tree-speciﬁc problem is advantageous when the cost function is
separable, then one can often just solve n independent problems Qi(xi;G) ! maxxi, for
each xi separately, at least when none of the not-in-tree constraints are binding.
For another special (ordered) case, Proposition 1 reduces the number of constraints
signiﬁcantly and, the only possible graph becomes known, a priori. It is the chain
(n ! n¡1 ! ::: ! 0). Unlike the non-ordered case, it also implies that higher valuation
function (agent’s number) relates to higher consumption and occupies a higher position
in the envy-graph.
Now consider implementation issue. For this we introduce notions related to bunching
and diﬀerent cycles in active digraphs (see examples and ﬁgures to comprehend the ideas).
Definition 1: A feasible bundle (¯ x;¯ t) 2 R2n in (1 )-(2) is called transitive-reduced
when its package-graph ¯ ¯ GP(¯ x;¯ t) is acyclic. A bundle (˜ x;˜ t) 2 R2n is called a transitive-
reduced version of a feasible bundle (¯ x;¯ t) 2 R2n, when its package-graph ¯ ¯ GP(˜ x;˜ t) is
acyclic and for every component (˜ xi;˜ ti) there is a prototype (¯ xj;¯ tj) = (˜ xi;˜ ti) (with the
same or other number j 6= i).10 A feasible bundle (¯ x;¯ t) is transitive-reducible when it has
a transitive-reduced version.
10In essence, reduction of a package-plan to its transitive version consists in just deleting some packages
and reallocating related agents to some remaining packages.
16The idea of small rewards for implementing principal’s package plan can now be for-
malized as follows.
Definition 2: A package bundle (¯ x;¯ t) is "-implementable when any neighborhood of
¯ t 2 Rn contains some tariﬀs t" 2 Rn resulting in an incentive-compatible bundle (¯ x;t")
which is “envy-free” (strictly incentive compatible). It means that all constraints ( 2)
are strict inequalities at (¯ x;t"), except bunched couples (i;j) : (xi;ti) = (xj;tj). I.e.,
package-graph ¯ ¯ GP(¯ x;t") has all nodes disconnected.
To better comprehend the deﬁnitions, note that a graph structure related to binding
constraints (those relevant for solution) may diﬀer from the structure of active constraints
deﬁned above. Consequently (see ﬁgures), an envy-free package bundle may be incentive-
incompatible!
REMARK 1: Any transitive-reduced optimal solution (˜ x;˜ t) is "-implementable.
It follows trivially from the deﬁnitions (see also Proof of Theorem 2).
We are ready to establish implementability and lack of essential splitting/cycles. It
can be guaranteed without restricting valuation functions, we just assume cost function
to be separable. To evaluate the usefulness of this assumption, recall counter-examples to
Theorem 2 (Examples 1, 5, Figures 1 and 5). In spite of cost convexity, these examples
show non-reducible envy-cycles, lack of implementability, optimal splitting of agent types –
all these because of non-separable costs. The key idea in establishing implementability for
separable costs is that higher/lower node’s position in envy-space (in digraph) correlates
with similar position in ‘proﬁt-space’ (deﬁned in the proof), so all cycles have the same
level of proﬁt. This enables eliminating cycles from package-graph without losses, by a
bunching procedure described in the proof (it is the second key idea).
THEOREM 2 (“Implementability”):11 Assume the cost function is separable: C(m;x) =
Pn
i=1 mic(xi) (some c : R 7! R). Then (A): For any solution (¯ x;¯ t) , any node i succeeding
11We are grateful to Denis Anoshin for his contribution in proving this theorem and some propositions
below. In particular, for checking the hypothesis that generalizes Theorem 2 from linear to separable
functions. We are grateful to Victor Polterovich for suggesting this generalization that enables us to
encompass all typical stochastic settings.
17a node j in the solution graph ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) : (j ! :::i); brings proﬁt no more than j in the
sense (¯ ti ¡c(¯ xi)) · (¯ tj ¡c(¯ xj)). (B): Any solution has a transitive-reduced version (˜ x;˜ t)
being "-implementable optimal solution and lacking type-splitting .12
Proof: Separability allows us to relate the solution’s in-rooted graph ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) of active
constraints to proﬁt-space placing the nodes with higher ‘per-package proﬁt’ (¯ ti ¡ c(¯ xi))
relatively higher in the graph. Suppose the graph ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) had a proﬁt-ascending arc
(j ! i) : (¯ ti¡c(¯ xi)) > (¯ tj ¡c(¯ xj)): Then transforming (only) package (¯ xj;¯ tj) into package
(ˆ xj;ˆ tj) = (¯ xi;¯ ti) we obtain a new package plan (ˆ x;ˆ t) 2 R2n; which improves objective
function by bringing more proﬁt. At the same time, it remains incentive-compatible
(feasible), since no new packages appears and, except j; all other agents remain unaﬀected,
and j has exactly the same payoﬀ as before, i.e., Vj(ˆ xj)¡ˆ tj = Vj(¯ xj)¡¯ tj ¸ Vj(¯ xk)¡¯ tk 8k.
So, the solution (¯ x;¯ t) was not optimal, resulting in a contradiction. Hence proﬁt-ascending
arcs or chains do not exist in ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) and any envy-cycle does have the same level of proﬁt
at all of its nodes.
This helps in proving reducibility and implementation. Let us construct the transitive-
reduced version of the solution. Take any cycle S µ ¯ ¯ G(¯ x;¯ t) and delete in it any quantity-
descending arc (j ! i) 2 S : ¯ xi < ¯ xj, replacing its tail-package (¯ xj;¯ tj) by the smaller
package (˜ xj;˜ tj) = (¯ xi;¯ ti) (head-package of this arc) in the package plan. By repeating
this procedure we can delete (not uniquely?) all quantity-descending arcs having the
same proﬁt levels. As a result, we reach a new package plan (˜ x;˜ t) whose package-graph
¯ ¯ GP(˜ x;˜ t) is acyclic, since a cycle cannot have only quantity-ascending arcs, while quantity-
descending arcs are deleted (when quantities of two packages coincide, tariﬀs coincide
also, so only bunched or quantity-descending arcs remain in ¯ ¯ G(˜ x;˜ t)). No new package-
nodes appear, and none of the agents become worse oﬀ because all transformations are
along indiﬀerence curves. Therefore, the new transitive-reduced plan (˜ x;˜ t) is incentive-
compatible. At the same time, the new plan (˜ x;˜ t) gives the same proﬁt as the optimal (¯ x;¯ t)
one: Therefore, reducibility is proved. We also see that splitting (if any) was redundant,
since it is excluded in the cycle-free plan (˜ x;˜ t).
12In this context ‘splitting’ means that formally diﬀerent consumers with coinciding tastes (Vi = Vj)
choose diﬀerent packages. For ‘no-splitting’ they must choose the same package.
18Let us construct exact "-implementation of any transitive-reduced solution (˜ x;˜ t) by
changing tariﬀs ti so that (˜ x;˜ t) is transformed into a similar envy-free bundle (˜ x;ˆ t) ¼
(˜ x;¯ t). Deﬁne constraint’s slack as ±ij := (Vj(˜ xj) ¡ ˜ tj) ¡ (Vj(˜ xi) ¡ ˜ ti) and choose ˆ ± :=
minf8i;j:±ij>0gf±ijg > 0 from all non-active constraints. Then starting from any envy-free
package-node k (the summit of any branch, including possibly several agent-nodes), take
arbitrarily-small positive quantity "1 < ˆ ±=2; and reduce the related tariﬀ in the sense
ˆ tk := ˜ tk ¡ "1. This eliminates envy-arc(s) going from k, so some tree below the package
node(s) becomes envy-free. Suﬃciently small "1 ensures that no arcs going to k emerge
from reduction in ˜ tk. Repeat this operation on another envy-free node with "2 < "1=2
and so on. Thus the envy-free approximation of (˜ x;˜ t) can be constructed for all "1 < ˆ ±=2.
Q.E.D.
To see the broad application of this theorem, note that a typical stochastic setting has
separable cost function.13 So splitting and implementation problems are serious mainly in
deterministic settings, or in some non-trivial stochastic situations with complex costs. For
these situations we try to establish no-cycle conditions by restricting costs and valuations
together as formulated in the following deﬁnition of convexity and gross convexity.
Definition 3: Gross convexity of the problem (3) for a given solution (¯ x;¯ t) and its
tree GT(¯ x;¯ t) takes place when an admissible set X is convex, cost function C(:) is convex
w.r.t. x on its domain and all (¯ x;¯ t)¡related partial objective functions Qi(¢) deﬁned in
(5) are concave on X. Gross convexity is called ‘strict’ when all Qi(¢) are strictly concave.
(Strict) convexity is deﬁned similarly by considering valuations Vi(¢) instead of Qi(¢).
Unfortunately, Examples 2 and 5 show that neither strict convexity nor non-strict
gross convexity are suﬃcient for eliminating non-reducible cycles. It is strictness of gross
convexity that can eliminate cycles completely, as stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 2: Assume cost function as aggregate-type in the sense C(m;x) =
c(
Pn
i=1 mixi); where c(:) is a diﬀerentiable function (c : R 7! R). Functions Vi are contin-
uous. Strict gross convexity of the problem at solution (¯ x;¯ t) takes place and all agent types
show the same quantities: mi = mj 8i;j 2 I: Then solution’s package-graph ¯ ¯ GP(¯ x;¯ t) is
13Recall, situations where several customers can be served in a period, can have more complex cost
functions.
19acyclic and (¯ x;¯ t) is an "-implementable solution without type-splitting.
Proof: in the Appendix (it is based on cycle-reduction ideas mentioned above and
in Proposition 4).
Proposition 2 is illustrated by Example 2, where cycles cannot be eliminated under
non-strict gross convexity. How realistic is the assumption of ‘gross convexity’ at the
solution? To guarantee this property in an ad hoc fashion without knowing the solution
tree, we should restrict valuations too much. Indeed, most often a function that should
be concave for this property, looks like Qi(xi;G) := (Si+1 + mi)Vi(xi) ¡ Si+1Vi+1(xi).
So all neighboring in the tree valuation functions Vi must have not-too-diﬀerent second
derivatives,14 or more concave functions must precede by number (succeed in the in-tree).
This sequence and gross convexity can be violated in solutions: see Example 5. Can we
weaken other assumptions of Proposition 2? Diﬀerentiability is essential (see Example 2).
“Coinciding quantities” assumption is not really restrictive, since in a simple deterministic
case one can treat each consumer as a separate type.
Regarding other possible statements about implementation, we conjecture some con-
dition only on valuations Vi that excludes non-reducible cycles for any cost function.
Another possible extension is to prove that any example with essentially-diﬀerent agents
and with cycles ‘non-implementable by rations’ is degenerate in some sense. It seems
that any cycle can be eliminated with probability 1 by a slight perturbation of valuation
functions, if this perturbation is diﬀerent for diﬀerent agent-nodes. If this is true then
such bad cycles as in Example 1 ‘almost never’ exist. In contrast, it is not the case with
splitted cycles (often occurring among similar agents) like in Examples 2 and 5. Here
it is more natural to study perturbations of valuations among agent types, not among
agent-nodes. In particular, by slightly varying common valuation function v3 = v4 = v5 of
the entire agent type (agents #3, #4, #5) in Example 2, one can keep the splitting-eﬀect
14For instance, one can prove by contradiction that gross convexity must hold for any solution to
3-agents problem when second derivatives satisfy condition 2j¨ vi(x)j · 3j¨ vj(x)j 8x;i;j. This condition
on derivatives is suﬃcient also to ensure concavity of Qi on any chain of a solution graph, but not at
branching points.
20and the related cycle, so the example is non-degenerate!
Now from no-cycle conditions we turn to related eﬃciency issue.
4 envy-free summits and efficiency
We now derive some properties of solutions. The interesting one is ‘partial eﬃciency’
of at least some packages among the optimal package scheme. Roughly, partial eﬃciency
of some agent’s package (¯ xi;¯ ti) means that consumer i would not wish to increase her
package size ¯ xi, for the price equal to marginal costs, and similar decrease is also un-
wanted. As revealed in Guesnerie and Seade (1984, Propositions 2-4), partial eﬃciency is
tightly, but non-trivially connected with these packages being ‘envy-free’ (being ‘leaves’
of related graphs) and with lack of cycles at ‘summits’. We now extend these results by
dropping ‘locally- diﬀerent valuations’ assumption (Examples 1and 5 violate it) that is
too restrictive. Instead we assume valuations being quasi-linear. 15
Definition 4: Given Xn;Vi(:);C(:); a package quantity ¯ xi is called “partially-eﬃcient”
in a situation ¯ x = (¯ x1;:::; ¯ xn) 2 Xn when partial welfare function Wi;¯ x(xi) := miVi(xi) ¡
C(m; ¯ x1;:::;xi;:::; ¯ xn) attains its maximum on X at point ¯ xi.16
Definition 5: A subgraph S µ G of digraph G is an (in-)branch if it is connected
and no arc leads to S from G n S. A subgraph S µ G is called a branch-summit of G;
when S is a branch not containing other branches, so that all nodes of S are equally high.
A single-node branch is a leaf or source.
15Compare our below propositions with its following alternative formulation, almost-coinciding with
Propositions 2-4 in Guesnerie and Seade (1982). Suppose cost function is linear, valuation functions Vi(:)
are strictly concave and diﬀerentiable on R+. Suppose additionally, that all agents have locally-diﬀerent
derivatives at the solution (xi;ti); i.e. ˙ vi(xi;ti) 6= ˙ vj(xi;ti). Then there is at least one ‘envy-free’ agent i
in tree G. She has partially-eﬃcient package (xi;ti), and no other agents choose it (no bunching).
16For a better intuition and to allow generalizations (non-quasi-linearity), this deﬁnition can be refor-
mulated as follows. For eﬃciency, weakly-more-preferred set of packages Li := Li(¯ x;¯ t) := f(a;t) 2
X £ RjVi(a) ¡ t ¸ Vi(¯ xi) ¡ ¯ tig must not intersect with the higher-proﬁt set Mi(¯ x;¯ t) := f(a;t) 2
X £ Rjt ¡ C(m; ¯ x1;:::; ¯ xi¡1;a; ¯ xi+1;:::¯ xi) > ¯ ti ¡ C(m; ¯ x1;:::; ¯ xi¡1; ¯ xi; ¯ xi+1;:::¯ xi)g:
21Propositions 3 and 4 show diﬀerent conditions for partial eﬃciency of branch-summits
and ‘proﬁt-summits’ (deﬁned below), together with additional properties.
Proposition 3: Let cost function C(:) be separable, then
(a). There exist partially-eﬃcient packages among components of any solution (¯ x;¯ t).
Moreover, the solution’s proﬁt-summit (the collection S of the highest-proﬁt nodes k :
(¯ tk ¡c(¯ xk)) ¸ (¯ ti ¡c(¯ xi))8i8k 2 S) has only partially-eﬃcient nodes and consists of one
or more branches.17
(b). When each personalized welfare function Wi;¯ x(xi) = mi(Vi(xi) ¡ c(xi) + const) is
unimodal on admissible set X, then in the proﬁt-summit of solution’s package-graph GP
there are only leaves, i.e., no cycles exist in the proﬁt-summit of GP.18
Proposition 4: Assume convex X µ R; cost function is of aggregate-type: C(m;x) =
c(
Pn
i=1 mixi) where c : R 7! R is continuous. Let all partial welfare functions Vi(xi) ¡
c(
Pn
j=1 mjxj) be continuous, concave w.r.t. xi on their domain: Let a branch-summit S ½
¯ ¯ GP of a solution’s package-graph ¯ ¯ GP(¯ x;¯ t) include only agents with the same quantities:
mi = mj 8i;j 2 S: Then:
(a). S has only partially-eﬃcient packages.
(b). Suppose additionally that c(:) is convex and diﬀerentiable and all Vi (8i 2 S) are
concave. Then S has uniform relative-proﬁt level in the sense [ti¡¯ cxi = tj¡¯ cxj (8i;j 2 S),
where ¯ c = 1
mi@c(
P
i mi¯ xi)=@xj (8j 2 S)]. Besides, upper envelope of active indiﬀerence
curves of S locally coincide with the related linear interval [(¯ xˆ k;¯ tˆ k);(¯ xˇ k;¯ tˇ k)], where ¯ xˆ k :=
mini2Sf¯ xig; ¯ xˇ k := maxi2Sf¯ xig:
COROLLARY 1: Under assumptions of Proposition 4 each solution has a partially-
eﬃcient node.
COROLLARY 2: In the case (b) under additional assumption of strict concavity of
all Vi, each branch-summit S is a leaf (so has no cycles).
Proofs: see Appendix.
17There are examples when proﬁt-summit is a chain, not a branch-summit. These two notions may
diﬀer even for linear costs.
18Unimodality is a weaker condition than strict concavity of V and convexity of c(:). It prevents cycles
within branches like the one in Example 3.
22Counter-examples to Propositions 3 and 4 (Examples 2, 3 and 6) illustrate the related
ideas and show why the assumptions are essential.
[FIGURE 2]
Example 2 (Figure 2): illustrates Propositions 4 and 2. It shows that in spite
of solution’s gross convexity and Pareto-eﬃciency, type-splitting, envy-cycle and non-
implementability may occur, resulting in some loss of proﬁt, without strict convexity.
Consider a package problem in terms of net valuations and costs, or just a problem with
satiable demand.19 The net cost function is C(xsum) = 0:0001=(6:442878 ¡ minfxsum;
6:442878g); where xsum :=
P
xi: Thus production below 6:3 is almost costless, while
production xsum ¸ 6:442878 is inﬁnitely costly. Net valuations of buyers are:
v1(x1) = 4x1 ¡ 3:2x2
1; v2(x2) = 1:32x2 ¡ 0:36x2
2;
vi(xi) = minf 5xi; 1 + 0:01xi ; 12 ¡ 4xig (i = 3;4;5):
The solution is: ¯ x1 = 0:623438; ¯ x2 = 1:819440; ¯ x3 = 0:25; ¯ x4 = 0:95; ¯ x5 = 2:7; t ¼
(1:25;1:21;1:0025;1:0095;1:027). Output is xsum = 6:342878. This plan is optimal because
all the consumer surplus goes to the principal and the solution is Pareto-eﬃcient. Indeed,
all agents get their most-preferred quantities, all derivatives being v0
i(xi) = C0(6:342878) =
0:01 (see Figure 2). Hence it is a ‘ﬁrst-best’ solution giving revenue (almost equal to proﬁt)
like
P
i ti ¼ 5:499. It is a unique solution (if permutations of #3, #4 and #5 are not
considered), because increasing any of the packages ¯ xi (without changing other packages)
would result in a great additional cost, while decreasing packages would reduce proﬁt.20
Therefore, to keep the same proﬁt, ‘splitting’ is inevitable, i.e., diﬀerent packages occur
for essentially similar agents #3, #4 and #5. Hence, envy-cycle is inevitable and so is
non-implementability by rewards.
19Like in Example 1, we can add here linear component Nx;(8N > 4) to cost function and to all
valuations. It keeps the essence of the example, but eliminates agents’ satiability (used only for convenient
exposition).
20In contrast, taking completely ﬂat valuations vi(xi) = minf 5xi; 1; 12¡4xig (i = 3;4;5) we would
arrive at approximately the same solution, which is not unique, because three packages could be made
smaller: ¯ xi = 0:623438 (i = 3;4;5), so envy-cycle is eleminated without losing proﬁt.
23This optimal package plan seems implementable by rations. But it is suﬃcient to
modify function v5(:) := minf 0:95x5; 1+0:01x5 ; 12¡4x5g as shown by the dotted line
in Figure 2 to eliminate “complete” digraph among agents #3, #4 and #5, since agent #5
stops almost-envying #3. Then the same solution becomes non-implementable by rations.
Indeed, suppose that agents #3, and #4 choose packages #5, and #4, which are in a
limited supply. Afterwards when the ﬁfth agent appears he is forced to take (0;0);and
proﬁt is reduced. Here non-active constraints [(#i !#1), (#i !#2) (i = 3;4;5)] prevent
elimination of undesirable cycle!
Now, let us see whether diﬀerentiability is essential for Propositions 2 and 4 to guar-
antee uniform proﬁt-level (important for the proof). Slightly modifying the example, we
take a piece-wise linear cost function C(xsum) = maxf0; 1000(xsum ¡ 6:342878)g, being
completely ﬂat below xsum = 6:342878. Almost nothing changes in Figure 2 and in the
optimal solution, which remains the same and unique. But, unlike the previous case,
now the relative proﬁt level ti ¡ xiC0(6:342878) = ti diﬀers among the cycled nodes #3,
#4, #5. Thus we have Pareto-eﬃcient branch-summit cycle with non-uniform proﬁt-
level. Further modiﬁcation of indiﬀerence curves (moving (x4;t4) slightly up) may also
disturb the “ﬂat-roof” property of branch summit (#3, #4 and #5), i.e., linearity of the
indiﬀerence curve envelope connecting (x3;t3);(x4;t4);(x5;t5): jj
[FIGURE 3]
Example 3 (Figure 3): It shows the absence of partially-eﬃcient agents, ineﬃciency
in spite of star-graph (due to costs non-convexity and non-separability).
Suppose only 4 discrete quantities of total production are really feasible:
xsum = 0, 7, 7:1, 7:2, or 7:3: For these quantities the cost function is C(0) = 0; C(7) =
C(7:1) = C(7:2) = C(7:3) = 3. For other quantities costs are prohibitively high: xsum 6=
0;7;7:1;7:2;7:3 ) C(xsum) = 1000. There are two agents of type 2 (m2 = 2) and three
(m1 = 3) agents of type 1, with valuations as follows.
V1(0) = 0; V1(1) = 5; V1(1:1) = 5:1; V1(2) = 6; V1(2:1) = 7:2; m1 = 3.
V2(0) = 0; V2(1) = 4; V2(1:1) = 5:2; V2(2) = 7; V2(2:1) = 7:1; m2 = 2:
24Package bundle f(x1;t1);(x2;t1)g = f(1;5);(2;7)g is strictly incentive compatible (no
envy occurs). It yields xsum = 3x1 +2x2 = 7 and proﬁt ¼(1;2) = 3¤5+2¤7¡3 = 26: It
is optimal. Indeed, among other combinations (x1;x2); technologically feasible (without
type-splitting) ones are only (0;0) ! xsum = 0, (1:1; 2) ! xsum = 3 ¤ 1:1 + 2 ¤ 2 = 7:3
and (1; 2:1) ! xsum = 7:2. Note that technology enables only to increase either the
ﬁrst or the second package by 0:1. This would increase related payoﬀ, tariﬀ and proﬁt,
so current package scheme is ineﬃcient. However, it creates incentive for another agent
to switch to this new package. Therefore both ‘improvements’ (1:1; 2) and (1; 2:1) are
incentive incompatible, yielding actually non-feasible demand (x1;x2) = (1:1; 1:1) !
xsum = 5 and (x1;x2) = (2:1; 2:1) ! xsum = 10; respectively. Thus, even though
the optimal package scheme is envy-free, partial eﬃciency is absent because non-active
constraints are binding. Can rationing solve this problem and increase proﬁt? We do not
ﬁnd any such improvement. For instance, by using package scheme f(x1;t1);(x2;t1)g =
f(1; 5);(2:1; 7:2)g and restricting purchase to no more than 1 package of size 2.1, the
seller could be better oﬀ, but agent of type 1 can switch to the new package. Note also
that diﬀerent numbers m1 = 3 6= m2 = 2 of consumers are important for our conclusions.jj
Now turn from partial eﬃciency to general Pareto-eﬃciency, which is important for
public policy. Should price discrimination be restricted? In contrast to the ordered-
valuations case, Pareto-eﬃciency is not a degenerate case under non-ordered valuations
as stated in Remark 2 below. In fact, the situations leading to Pareto eﬃciency are quite
probable.
REMARK 2: Assume costs are separable. Then, for some package scheme (¯ x;¯ t) to
be optimal and Pareto-eﬃcient at the same time (i.e., ﬁrst-best), it is suﬃcient that the
related net-valuation functions satisfy the following conditions.
Vi(xj) ¡ Vj(xj) · 0;8i;j
xi = argmaxx2X(Vi(x) ¡ c(x)).
Proof: Maximization condition implies partial eﬃciency for all i, which entails
Pareto-eﬃciency here. No-envy condition on Vi(xj) implies tariﬀs ti = Vi(xi) and zero
consumer surplus. This results in maximal proﬁt.jj
25In essence, these conditions only require that each net valuation curve should have
maximum lying above all other curves (implying star-like solution graph). Hence the
class of functions/packages satisfying these conditions is suﬃciently broad.21 These con-
ditions are also necessary for Pareto-eﬃciency in two-consumers case. In general, however,
they are not, as shown by Example 4 below (see Figure 4). But such examples repre-
sent rather degenerate cases. Similar (not exactly the same) condition is that solution
should have a star-like graph. This is also close to necessary and suﬃcient condition for
Pareto-eﬃciency, but it is really not. Example 4 contradicts necessity, while Example
3 contradicts suﬃciency (being non-degenerate, but very peculiar, non-convex). Under
problem convexity star-like graph is suﬃcient for Pareto-eﬃciency, which follows from
Proposition 4.
By the way, the same star-graph condition is closely related with another interest-
ing question: Is there any consumer surplus (the so-called ‘informational rent’) arising
from monopolist’s inability to distinguish consumers’ types? Remark below answers the
question.
REMARK 3: Agent(s) connected to the root of the solution graph ¯ ¯ G have zero
consumer surplus, and there is at least one such agent i with zero surplus (Vi(¯ xi)¡¯ ti = 0).
Conversely, agent(s) (if any) not connected to the root of the tree G do have positive
consumer surplus (positive informational rent for those whose participation constraints
are not active).
So, Pareto-eﬃciency and informational rent are almost conversely related. Roughly,
star-graph condition ensures eﬃciency and excludes rent. Normally Pareto-eﬃciency does
not allow consumer surplus (informational rent), except in some peculiar or degenerate
counter-examples. Such examples can be constructed either from non-diﬀerentiable valu-
ation functions, or from counter-veiling eﬀect, as illustrated below.
[FIGURE 4]
21This Remark seems extendable to the case of non-separable cost functions. Complete study of
eﬃciency and all kinds of ineﬃciencies for two linear-demand consumers, see our another paper (2002,
www.math.nsc.ru/˜mathecon/kokovin).
26Example 4 (Figure 4): It shows a Pareto-eﬃcient solution, still having positive
consumer surplus (informational rent). There are 3 consumers. Costs are assumed to be
zero and demands are satiable (or it is a picture of ‘net valuations’). All three packages are
located at satiation points, and hence they are eﬃcient. This tree is (2!1, 3!1, 1!#0)
and other trees cannot bring an optimal package scheme when type 1 consumers are much
more numerous than the other two. The second and the third consumers envy the ﬁrst
one, and not #0, so both of them enjoy informational rent. In spite of informational rent,
eﬃciency remains, because they symmetrically outweigh each other (a degenerate case)
in the sense that @
@x1[V2(¯ x1) + V3(¯ x1)] = 0. As a result, at point ¯ xi; argmaximum of the
function Qi(xi)¡C(m;x) (required for proﬁtability of ¯ xi) coincide with the argmaximum
of miVi(xi) ¡ C(m;x); which is required for eﬃciency of ¯ xi.
Obviously, such coincidence of argmaxima is a rare and degenerate cases. Normally
informational rent precludes eﬃciency.
5 conclusions
For the standard package problem we have analyzed solution structure, envy-cycles,
types splitting and implementation of solutions. All these considerations become impor-
tant and relevant when valuations are non-ordered. Non-standard “rationing” approach
for implementation is suggested.
Under weak restrictions, the standard solution has some graph structure that can
be used for optimization and for deriving properties. Some conditions for both partial
and Pareto-eﬃciency are established. Under reasonable assumptions, existence of Pareto-
eﬃciency and consumer surplus (informational rent) are mutually exclusive. Conditions
for implementability of standard-optimal pricing scheme are derived, counter-examples
showing the importance of such conditions.
appendix
Proof OF THEOREM 1:
27A. We must show that consumers’ set I can be partitioned into a sequence of some
N · n non-intersecting sets (layers) ˆ I = I0[I1[:::[IN in a special manner. Speciﬁcally,
each layer Ik must encompass all nodes (consumers) connected to the root with some k-
long chain of arcs, which is the shortest way to the root. Let us construct such sequence
of layers starting from the root: I0 := f0g and making sure that the next layer is also
non-empty. Indeed, if I1 were empty, one could improve the solution (¯ x;¯ t) by increasing
all tariﬀs ti : i ¸ 1 simultaneously for some positive quantity. This is obvious from (1)-(2).
So, the ﬁrst layer is non-empty, i.e., ; 6= I1 := fi : Vi(xi)¡ti = 0g: By similar arguments,
for some agent k not in I0[ I1, her tariﬀ tk must be bounded from above by some active
incentive constraint (see inequalities (1)-(2)). Moreover, some of such active constraints
must connect agent k to some agent j from the previous layer I1, otherwise one could
increase all tariﬀs simultaneously for agents not in I0[ I1 (connected to I1 means that the
tariﬀ tj in the right-hand side of some incentive constraint relates to some agent j 2 I1).
Thus this node k must belong to I2 := fi : Vi(xi) ¡ ti = Vi(xj) ¡ tj 9j 2 I1g and this set
is non-empty. Arguing similarly for higher layers, one can further construct the needed
non-empty, non-intersecting sequences of layers until I is exhausted. This results in the
needed root-connected subgraph.
B. Since a tree can always be chosen from the already found root-connected subgraph,
some tree G = GT = G(¯ x;¯ t) of active-constraints exists. Take any such tree. To prove
its properties, one must compare the solutions of the new G¡speciﬁc problem with the
optimum of the initial problem. In essence, the only diﬀerence between the new (3)
and the initial problem (1)-(2) lies in replacing active inequalities (i;j) 2 G by similar
equalities, thus making the constraints set more restrictive in deriving tariﬀs Tk(xi) :=
P
i2B(k;G)[fkg[Vi(xi) ¡ Vi(xb(i;G))]. So at point (¯ x;¯ t); the new objective function takes
the optimal value of the old function and the new constraints are satisﬁed. The new
constraints-set is more restrictive than the old one, so no admissible (˜ x;˜ t) can be better
than (¯ x;¯ t) in the new problem. Therefore, (¯ x;¯ t) is optimal. At the same time, any
solution (˜ x;˜ t) to the new problem must be as good as (¯ x;¯ t) for both (coinciding) objective
functions. Therefore, it is also a solution to the old problem (1)-(2).jj
28Proof OF Proposition 1 (“Chain-Rule,” compare with Katz, 1983):
The Proposition states that, at the solution, every agent i 2 I “almost-envies” her
closest lower-demand neighbor, and no one else. For constraints that “almost-envy” the
lower-demand neighbor, we should prove that all these constraints are binding (being
equalities) at any solution, while all other remaining constraints are not binding in the
sense that they can be eliminated or replaced with constraints xi ¸ xi¡1 without altering
the solution.
1) Consider any incentive-compatible scheme (¯ x;¯ t): By rearranging any pair i;k of
incentive-compatibility constraints we get relation Vk(¯ xi) ¡ Vk(¯ xk) · ¯ ti ¡ ¯ tk · Vi(¯ xi) ¡
Vi(¯ xk). Note that ¯ xi = ¯ xk ) ¯ ti = ¯ tk. For i > k; such inequality together with the Spence-
Mirrlees assumption of ordered valuations (OV) entails ¯ xi ¸ ¯ xk. Therefore, constraints
[xi ¸ xi¡18i] are satisﬁed by any admissible (x;t), and adding them to initial constraints do
not change the admissible set. When using ordering [¯ xi ¸ ¯ xi¡18i], note that when some
consumer i does not (strictly) envy someone whose consumption level (and to related
tariﬀ) is lower ¯ xk < ¯ xi; then any higher-demand agent j > i also does not envy (¯ xk;¯ tk).
Indeed, from [¯ ti ¡ ¯ tk · Vi(¯ xi) ¡ Vi(¯ xk); ¯ xk < ¯ xi] ) (using OV under j > i; ¯ xk < ¯ xi · ¯ xj)
[¯ ti ¡ ¯ tk · Vj(¯ xi) ¡ Vj(¯ xk)] ) (using incentive constraint ¯ ti ¸ ¯ tj ¡ Vj(¯ xj) + Vj(¯ xi) and
replacing ¯ ti with smaller expression) [(¯ tj ¡ Vj(¯ xj) + Vj(¯ xi)) ¡ ¯ tk · Vj(¯ xi) ¡ Vj(¯ xk)] )
[¯ tj¡¯ tk · Vj(¯ xj)¡Vj(¯ xk)]. Thus, without changing the admissible set, we can eliminate
all constraints that represent envying a lower number agent’s (k < j) constraints (they are
nonessential after constraints [xi ¸ xi¡18i] are added), except the neighboring constraints
(k = j ¡ 1 < j).
2) Now suppose that (¯ x;¯ t) not only is feasible but it is also a solution. Consider
the chain of “neighboring” constraints [0 · V1(¯ x1) ¡ ¯ t1;V2(¯ x1) ¡ ¯ t1 · V2(¯ x2) ¡ ¯ t2;:::
...Vn(¯ xn¡1) ¡ ¯ tn¡1 · Vn(¯ xn) ¡ ¯ tn]: If the ﬁrst inequality were strict, we could increase
tariﬀ t1, thereby improving the objective function, other inequalities are satisﬁed. But,
this contradicts the supposition that (¯ x;¯ t) was a solution. Similarly, all relations of
this chain are equalities at any solution of the initial (and of the modiﬁed) problem.
Combining these equalities with ordering [¯ xi ¸ ¯ xi¡1] and the assumption of OV, entails
[Vi(¯ xi) ¡ Vi(¯ xi¡1) = ¯ ti ¡ ¯ ti¡1 ¸ Vi¡1(¯ xi) ¡ Vi¡1(¯ xi¡1) ¸ Vi¡2(¯ xi) ¡ Vi¡2(¯ xi¡1)]; implying
29that any agent i ¡ 1 does not strictly-envy her higher-number neighbor i. Now take the
similar relation [¯ ti¡1¡¯ ti¡2 ¸ Vi¡2(¯ xi¡1)¡Vi¡2(¯ xi¡2)] for agent i¡2: By substituting here
the left side of former-obtained expression ¯ ti ¡ Vi¡2(¯ xi) + Vi¡2(¯ xi¡1) ¸ ¯ ti¡1 for ¯ ti¡1, we
get [¯ ti ¡Vi¡2(¯ xi) ¸ ¯ ti¡2 ¡Vi¡2(¯ xi¡2)]. Thus all constraints that represent not envying the
higher-number agents are redundant in the modiﬁed problem. They follow from ordering
¯ xi ¸ ¯ xi¡1; OV and equalities [Vi(¯ xi) ¡ Vi(¯ xi¡1) = ¯ ti ¡ ¯ ti¡1; ¯ xi ¸ ¯ xi¡1 8i].
Thus, the set of solutions to initial problem is equivalent to the set of solutions to the
modiﬁed problem. Q.E.D.
We can add that when functions increase, then the implications is [¯ xi ¸ ¯ xk , ¯ ti ¸ ¯ tk].
Proof of Proposition 3:
(a) Because the cost function is separable, the notion of proﬁt-summit S for a solution
(¯ x;¯ t) is deﬁnite. Let S include the ﬁrst consumer, i.e., (¯ t1 ¡ c(¯ x1)) ¸ (¯ ti ¡ c(¯ xi))8i 2 ¯ ¯ G:
Assume this node (¯ x1;¯ t1) is partially-ineﬃcient, implying that it could be replaced by an
alternative node (˜ x1;˜ t1) 2 L1(¯ x;¯ t) := f(a;t) 2 X £ RjV1(a) ¡ t ¸ V1(¯ x1) ¡ ¯ t1g which
is weakly-preferred to (¯ x1;¯ t1) and gives more proﬁt than (¯ x1;¯ t1) and other packages:
(˜ t1 ¡ c(˜ x1)) > (¯ ti ¡ c(¯ xi))8i 2 ¯ ¯ G (by transitivity). When we replace ﬁrst agent’s package
(¯ x1;¯ t1) with the new one (˜ x1;˜ t1); she has no incentive to switch from (˜ x1;˜ t1) to any other
package. Since (˜ x1;˜ t1) 2 L1, her incentive-compatibility constraints are not violated.
However, other agents i 6= 1 may now switch to this new package (˜ x1;˜ t1) (i.e., their old
packages may become incentive incompatible). But this switching is proﬁtable. More
formally, the initial bundle (¯ x;¯ t) can be transformed into a new bundle (˜ x;˜ t), such that
(¯ x1;¯ t1) is replaced by (˜ x1;˜ t1) and (˜ x1;˜ t1) also replaces all packages (¯ xi;¯ ti) envying (˜ x1;˜ t1),
i.e., for all i : Vi(˜ x1)¡ ˜ t1 > Vi(¯ xi)¡ ¯ ti. This new bundle (˜ x;˜ t) satisﬁes all constraints and
brings more proﬁt, so the initial package could not have been optimal. A contradiction.
Similarly we prove that each proﬁt-summit S is envy-free, otherwise an agent who
almost-envies a package from S could be given this package resulting in a higher proﬁt.
(b) Unimodality assumption means that the unconstrained maximum of personalized
welfare function (that can be reduced to Vi(x) ¡ c(x) for maximization) on X is unique.
30It coincides with the constrained maximum ¯ xi for i 2 S, because all the constraints in
(4) can be shown to be non-binding. Indeed, as explained in the proof of (a), if this
welfare function had a better value at some point ˜ xi 2 X, then ¯ xi could be replaced by
˜ xi improving proﬁt (due to maximum-proﬁt assumption for ¯ xi : i 2 S). Suppose there
existed two diﬀerent package nodes k;k0 2 S : (¯ xk0;¯ tk0) 6= (¯ xk;¯ tk) connected with an arc of
envy: 9i 2 S : (¯ xi;¯ ti) = (¯ xk;¯ tk); Vi(¯ xk0;¯ tk0)¡¯ tk0 = Vi(¯ xk;¯ tk)¡¯ tk: Taking into account that
proﬁt level of nodes k;k0 2 S is the same; this then means that the objective function
Vi(x) ¡ c(x) has two diﬀerent maxima (¯ xk0;¯ tk0) 6= (¯ xk;¯ tk) on X. This contradicts the
unimodality assumption.jj
PROOF OF Proposition 4: Take any package-node k 2 S from branch-summit
S (the only non-trivial case is when S contains several cycled nodes) and any agent-
node i belonging to k : (¯ xk;¯ tk) = (¯ xi;¯ ti): Deﬁne agent i’s strictly-higher-proﬁt set
Mi ½ R2 as Mi(¯ x;¯ t) := f(»;¿) 2 X £ Rj¿ ¡ C(m; ¯ x1;:::; ¯ xi¡1;»; ¯ xi+1;:::¯ xi) > ¯ ti ¡
C(m; ¯ x1;:::; ¯ xi¡1; ¯ xi; ¯ xi+1;:::¯ xi)g: Note that, for all agents (i : (¯ xk;¯ tk) = (¯ xi;¯ ti)) from
k, all such higher-proﬁt sets do coincide: Mi = Mj (j : (¯ xk;¯ tk) = (¯ xj;¯ tj)). This is
because of the assumption that mi = mj and construction of costs. Deﬁne also the
set Li ½ R2 consisting of all packages weakly-preferred to (¯ xi;¯ ti) as Li := Li(¯ x;¯ t) :=
f(»;¿) 2 X £ RjVi(») ¡ ¿ ¸ Vi(¯ xi) ¡ ¯ tig. Deﬁne the set K ½ S of all agents (includ-
ing all bunched within k) almost-envying this package (¯ xk;¯ tk). Deﬁne their joint set
LK := [i2KLi containing all weakly-preferred sets of packages. Suppose there exists an
intersection point (˜ xi;˜ ti) 2 LK \ Mi; so there exists a partially non-eﬃcient agent j:
(˜ xi;˜ ti) 2 Lj \ Mj = Lj \ Mi: When both Lj;Mi are convex then the whole semi-open
linear interval Ij = ((¯ xi;¯ ti);(˜ xi;˜ ti)] ½ Lj \ Mi belongs to the named intersection, i.e.,
brings the same or more payoﬀ to agent j from K (maybe j = i) and strictly more proﬁt
to principal than (¯ xj;¯ tj). In more general case, instead of straight interval Ij; we have
at least some connected set Ij (whose closure ¯ Ij connects points (¯ xi;¯ ti);(˜ xi;˜ ti) 2 ¯ Ij) with
the same property: Ij ½ Lj \ Mi. Indeed, by concavity assumption on Vi(:) ¡ C(:), the
diﬀerence-function '(») := Vi(»)¡C(m; ¯ x1;:::; ¯ xi¡1;»; ¯ xi+1;:::¯ xi)¡Vi(¯ xi)¡C(m; ¯ x) is zero
at point » = ¯ xi and it is positive at point ˜ xi, therefore it is positive on the whole interval
31(¯ xi; ˜ xi). This enables building the needed connected set Ij. It explains why Lj \ Mi has
points arbitrarily close to (¯ xi;¯ ti). Then LK \ Mi has them as well.
Branch-summit, choice of K, and continuity of Vi guarantee that there exists a suﬃ-
ciently small " > 0 and closed "¡ neighborhood B"K = B"K(¯ xi;¯ ti) := f(»;¿) : jj(»;¿) ¡
(¯ xi;¯ ti)jj · "g around the initial point (¯ xi;¯ ti) such that, except for agents from K (whose
active indiﬀerence curves are crossing at node k) nobody else can envy the points in
the neighborhood, i.e., Vj(») ¡ ¿ < Vj(¯ xj) ¡ ¯ tj (8j 6 2K;8(»;¿) 2 B"K). By using the
established non-emptiness of intersection LK \ Mi \ B"K 6= ;; we can now construct a
new intersection point (ˆ xˆ |;ˆ tˆ |) 2 LK \ Mi (9ˆ | 2 K) belonging also to ‘no-envy’ vicinity
B"K. In particular, among such points, we can take the highest one in the sense that
(ˆ xˆ |;ˆ tˆ |) : ˆ tˆ | ¸ 8¿ : (»;¿) 2 LK \Mi\B"K. The broader intersection LK \ ¯ Mi\B"K (where
¯ Mi denotes the closure of Mi) is compact by continuity assumption, hence the highest
point exists within it. In particular, it should be one of the two intersections between the
boundary of LK and the boundary of B"K. By deﬁnition of Mi , the boundary ¯ Mi n Mi
is the lower boundary of this set, so the distinction between ¯ Mi and Mi does not matter
for choosing (ˆ xˆ |;ˆ tˆ |). Here ˆ | denotes an agent whose indiﬀerence curve is active at point
(ˆ xˆ |;ˆ tˆ |), lying on the boundary of LK (which is always the upper boundary). By construc-
tion, there is such an agent ˆ | 2 K : Vˆ |(ˆ xˆ |)¡ˆ tˆ | = Vˆ |(¯ xˆ |)¡¯ tˆ |; and no one strictly envies this
point: Vi(ˆ xˆ |) ¡ ˆ tˆ | · Vi(¯ xi) ¡ ¯ ti 8i = 1;:::;n: Further take ˆ | ´ j for notation simplicity.
Suppose, this j is in the same package-node with initial i : (¯ xj;¯ tj) = (¯ xi;¯ ti). Then, by
replacing her package (¯ xj;¯ tj) by the new package (ˆ xj;ˆ tj), none of incentive-compatibility
constraints can be violated (using the ‘highest’ position of (ˆ xj;ˆ tj) in LK \ B"), while the
proﬁt strictly increases (we use here the fact that higher-proﬁt set Mi = Mj is the same
for both i;j, due to restrictions on C(:) and mi = mj). This contradicts optimality of
(¯ x;¯ t).
In the opposite case, when (¯ xj;¯ tj) 6= (¯ xi;¯ ti), we ﬁrst move all cycled agents around
the cycle connecting i and j, in particular, move one step in the direction of almost-envy.
Since this transformation of package scheme means that replacing the packages of almost-
envying-agents by the envied packages, it neither disturbs the incentive-compatibility
32constraints nor the total output and costs (we use assumption mi = mj). The set of
active indiﬀerence curves remains the same. After this transformation we come to a
contradiction similar to the one in case i : (¯ xj;¯ tj) = (¯ xi;¯ ti)
In essence, we have proved not only partial eﬃciency (Li \ Mi = ;), but even more
than needed: LK(k) \ Mi = ; (8k 2 GP(S);8i 2 K(k)): It is useful further.
Now we prove ﬂatness (within the cycle) of the uniﬁed set LS := [i2SLi (see Example
2). Under diﬀerentiability of c(:); we can use the marginal cost ¯ c := 1
mi@c(
P
i mi¯ xi)=@xj (9j 2
S); which is the same 8j 2 S, because mi = mjfor separating LS from Mi. Because of
partial-eﬃciency of i 2 S, convexity of more-proﬁtable sets Mi and more-utility sets Li,
we can separate each Mi from Li by a line L0i := f(x;t)jt = ¯ cx+c0ig with some constants
c0i, and such lines must have the same slope ¯ c for all i: Note that without diﬀerentiability,
a unique constant ¯ c separating each Mi from Li is not guaranteed (see Example 2). So, we
may speak of proﬁt-ascending or descending arcs relative to this unique (1; ¡¯ c) direction.
Arguing as we did for separable cost function, suppose there existed a proﬁt-ascending
arc (i ! j) of envy, then the related indiﬀerence curve Vi(x) = ti would ascend from
point (xi;ti) towards (xj;tj) and going somewhere higher than the separating line L0i.
This contradicts the separation of Mi from Li by L0i. We conclude that no ascending
arcs exist and branch-summit S becomes a ¯ c¡proﬁt-summit of this subgraph S, having
nodes not only with the same slope, but with the same proﬁt-level constants c0i = c0.
Consequently, the uniﬁed more-utility set LS appears ﬂat in the interval [(¯ xˆ k;¯ tˆ k);(¯ xˇ k;¯ tˇ k)]
stretching from the left-most node (¯ xˆ k;¯ tˆ k) : ¯ xˆ k · ¯ xi (8i 2 S) to the right-most node
(¯ xˇ k;¯ tˇ k) : ¯ xi · ¯ xˇ k (8i 2 S) in S. Here LS’s border is the line L0i. Moreover, all the arcs of
envy within the cycle S are the intervals of this line.
Consider COROLLARY 2 under Vi strict concavity. Now ﬂat border of any more-
preferred set Li is impossible, so left-most and right-most nodes (¯ xˆ k;¯ tˆ k);(¯ xˇ k;¯ tˇ k) of summit
S must coincide. This entails the absence of non-reduced cycles. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We shall use similar arguments for each Qi as we did for
Vi in proving Proposition 4(b).
An optimal solution enables one to optimize w.r.t. some variables when other variables
33are ﬁxed. We use induction starting from the highest level of the graph. By Proposition
4 all branch-summits of the active graph have no cycles. For this highest level of the
tree (tree is guaranteed by Theorem 1), the absence of cycles was proved by optimizing
w.r.t. its variables. All incentive-compatibility constraints (arcs of possible envy) leading
to these nodes were shown to be non-active. Hence they are non-binding or redundant
because of problem gross convexity. Arcs in the reverse direction, from these nodes,
by construction are taken into account in functions Qi: So, we can consider another
similar package-optimizing problem, without agents related to the highest-level nodes. We
eleminate highest-level nodes and arcs, but the valuation functions of second-highest level
nodes are replaced by new functions ˜ Vi(:) = Qi(:). Highest-level quantities xi are ﬁxed
in this optimization (being partially-eﬃcient), but, as reﬂected in Qi, the related tariﬀs
are optimized. Applying Proposition 4 again to the new problem we exclude cycles on
second-highest level. We approach another level in a similar fashion and so on, recursively.
Q.E.D.
examples
Example 5 (Figure 5): It shows optimal splitting of consumer types and cycle of envy
due to absence of gross convexity (and interesting quantity-descending digraph). There are
2 identical consumers with concave valuation functions vi(xi) := 0:8xi ¡ 0:4x2
i (i = 1;3)
and a diﬀerent agent with function v2(x2) := 3:0x2 ¡ 2:0x2
2. Convex cost function C
depends on output ¯ X = x1 + x2 + x3, according to C( ¯ X) := 0:02=(2 ¡ ¯ X) when ¯ X · 2;
and C( ¯ X) := 1 when ¯ X > 2: So production of more than 2 units is impossible (this
is the essence of the example). Optimal package scheme (found by numerical iterative
optimization) is: (x1;T1) = (0;0); (x2;T2) ¼ (0:487;0:986); (x3;T3) ¼ (1:375;0:344)
(similar splitting eﬀect can occur in other examples without having xi = 09i). Here
‘cycle of envy’ connects agents 1 and 3, while agents 2 has envy-free and partially-eﬃcient
package. Thus identical agents numbered 1 and 3 do choose diﬀerent packages. That is,
splitting of agents type (1 and 3) is optimal. It can be checked that this is strictly better
than any other plan.
34Further, one can check, that by removing the constraint of round number for the
allocated packages aik 2 Z+ (but keeping constraint a11 + a33 = 2) we should get almost
the same solution with optimal splitting. Therefore this eﬀect does not depend upon
agents’ discreetness or continuity.jj
Example 6:22 Figure 6 shows three packages and the related active indiﬀerence
curves. Agents #2 and #3 have similar valuations and envy each other, while agent #1
has envy-free but ineﬃcient node. In the deterministic interpretation of Example 6 (as
well as in Example 5) rationing may increase expected proﬁt beyond the standard-optimal!
Indeed, suppose that agent #1 comes last to buy after agents 2 and 3 have chosen their
packages. Suppose, the principal knows the existence of exactly 3 agents of certain types
in the market. In this situation he can easily identify that it is the type #1 agent coming
now, since the other two largest packages are already sold. So, if the principal is able
to use rationing, he should oﬀer now only package #1 to agent #1 stating that other
packages are unavailable. This strategy increases proﬁt at the Pareto-eﬃcient level giving
the ﬁrst best outcome!
Similarly, in Example 4, after agent #1 takes her package, thus revealing that only
agents #2 and #3 remain in the market, the principal can withdraw package #1 and
raise tariﬀs for packages #2 and #3.jj
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22Mainly, it explains proﬁtable rationing. Besides, Example 6 (Fig. 6) shows that: 1) claim (a) of
Proposition 3 cannot be easily extended to non-summit subgraph; 2) even under separable costs, in the
absence of concavity of valuations there can be essential cycles at proﬁt-summit and at envy-summit
(branch-summit); 3) when some non-active constraint binds, there can be a separate partially-ineﬃcient
leaf-node (envy-free node).
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FIGURE 1. Example 1: a cycle non-implementable by rations and rewards.
Left: active net-valuation curves with gradients, active cost curve.
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FIGURE 2. Example 2: splitting and non-implementable cycle, in spite of
convexity.
Left: active net valuation curves, gradients, packages.
Right: solution’s active graph. 
 (x1 , t1)










 2  1
FIGURE 3. Example 3: All nodes envy-free but inefficient (non-active
binding constraints).(x3,t3) (x2,t2)
`
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FIGURE  5. Example 5: a cycle non-implementable by rewards.
Left: active valuation curves, active cost curve.






















FIGURE 6. Example 6: envy-free but inefficient node (non-active binding
constraint). Rationing increases profit.